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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADVANCE BUSINESS EQUIPMENT, a : 
Utah Corporation, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : PETITION FOR WRIT 
: OF CERTIORARI 
vs. : 
PATRICIA M. BURKE, : Case No. 860070-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Trial Court erred in granting Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss, which was in effect, a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, when there were genuine issues of fact and law to be 
determined. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and on 
December 7, 1987, Judge Norman H. Jackson, of the Utah Court of 
Appeals filed the opinion affirming the Trial Court's decision. 
That a copy of that opinion is attached hereto as 
"Addendum 1". 
JURISDICTION 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is brought pursuant 
to Rule 42 of the Utah Supreme Court Rules. The Hearing on this 
case was in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah before the Honorable Judith Billings, 
sitting without a jury. The matter was appealed to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah and was thereafter transferred to the 
Utah Court of Appeals and a decision was made on December 7, 
1987. 
Prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) days period 
within in which to file this Petition, an Ex Parte Motion for an 
Extension of Time was made and a corresponding Order was signed 
by Justice Richard Howe of the Utah Supreme Court, extending the 
time for filing the Writ of Certiorari for an additional thirty 
(30) days or until February 7, 1988. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Rule 4 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, State of Utah, in that 
Appellant contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
this case is in conflict with the previous decisions of this 
Court concerning the nature of Summary Judgment proceedings and 
therefore, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is proper. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1) Rules 41 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the original proceeding, the Plaintiff, a Utah 
Corporation, filed an action against the Defendant, alleging 
fraudulent actions on the part of the Defendant in acquiring a 
piece of property in which the Plaintiff claimed an interest. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
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Baldwin, then Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, ruled 
that the property was marital property and awarded the home to 
the Defendant and the adjoining acreage to Richard Burke. 
For a variety of reasons, including the death of 
Defendant's original counsel, the Divorce Decree was never 
reduced to writing until 1985. The Decree was however, made in 
the form of a Nunc Pro Tunc Order and following the signing 
thereof, Richard Burke appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in Case 
No. 2 04 04. One of the issues in that appeal was Burke's 
insistence that the property awarded to both he and his wife was 
owned by the Plaintiff in this case and was not marital property. 
(In June of 1987, the Utah Supreme Court upheld Judge Baldwin's 
decision.) 
The Defendant had advised Richard Burke during the period 
of time during the divorce hearing in October of 1980 and the 
initiation of this action, that she had placed a lis pendens on 
the property and that she also intended to appeal, claiming that 
the entire property should have been awarded to her, that is the 
pasture land and the home. (See R. pg. 2-4 and 40-43) 
On approximately May 12, 1981, the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County Utah, sold to RoyType Division of Royal Business Machines, 
a Judgment creditor of the Plaintiff at public auction, the 
pasture land property. At that time, the Plaintiff did not have 
sufficient money to pay the Judgment or purchase the property, 
but had the six (6) month statutory redemption period provided by 
Utah law. 
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establish its interest in the property based upon the 
misrepresentations of the Defendant. Following the filing of the 
initial Complaint, (R. pg. 2-4), the Defendant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, alleging inter alia that misrepresentation had 
not taken place and fraud had not been plead with particularity. 
(R. pg. 24-29) 
A hearing was held on the Motion on June 29, 1984. (R. 
pg. 39) At that time, the Court denied the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and gave the 
Plaintiff ten (10) days to plead fraud with particularity. An 
amended Complaint was filed within the required time, (R. pg. 4 0-
42) in which the misrepresentation was plead with particularity. 
The Defendant then filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state 
a claim. (R. pg. 47-48) 
On September 7, 1984, following oral argument to the 
Court, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for no 
cause of action and quieted title to the Defendant. (R. pg. 63) 
That Order was appealed to the Supreme Court on October 18, 1984, 
who thereafter transferred it to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION TO DISMISS WHICH WAS IN EFFECT, 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN 
THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT AND 
LAW, WHICH REQUIRED A FULL EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING ON THE MERITS. 
This Court has consistently taken the position that any 
Summary proceeding, which is dispositive of the lawsuit, should 
be viewed with great caution, so that a party whose cause might 
have merit is not deprived of a right to have a full evidentiary 
hearing so that a decision can be made on the merits of his case. 
McBride v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 432, (Utah 1980) In this case, the 
Plaintiff filed an action to assert its rights in a piece of real 
estate in Salt Lake County. The Plaintiff's basic cause of 
action sounded in fraud, essentially the Plaintiff's position was 
that it had relied on certain representations made by the 
Defendant which caused it to forebear in taking any action to 
prevent the loss of its property in a foreclosure and quiet title 
action. 
There is no question that in fact, the Defendant did 
maintain a lis pendens on the property which caused the property 
to be encumbered and did not allow the Third Party Creditor 
(RoyType) to quiet title to the action until the Defendant 
removed her lis pendens. Additionally, the lis pendens was 
removed only when the Defendant herself, purchased the property 
directly from the Third Party Creditor, which then allowed her to 
accomplish what she had set out to do in the original divorce 
proceeding, but which Judge Baldwin had not allowed. 
Her motives therefore, in doing what she did are in 
question and Plaintiff had the right to explore those through a 
full evidentiary process. The factual dispute in the case is 
very simple. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant made 
certain representations to Richard Burke, upon which he relied, 
to his detriment and that Defendant made such representations 
deliberately, with the ultimate intent to cause the Plaintiff to 
forebear and to not take any action to protect itself and 
therefore, accomplish what she had set out to do four (4) years 
earlier in the divorce proceeding. 
The Defendant of course, denies these allegations and 
alleges that certain representations were not made and that her 
actions were completely unrelated to her prior involvement with 
Richard Burke and her frustration over the inability to obtain 
the property in the Divorce Decree. 
It is clear therefore, that there were disputed facts 
which required a Trial. Both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals seem to side step this issue as its appears obvious to 
the Plaintiff that based upon that alone, the case should have 
been remanded for Trial and focused on the aspect of Judge 
Billings initial decision in which she indicated that even if the 
allegations were correct, it would not affect the Plaintiff's 
title to the property because of the Third Party intravention. 
The problem with both this argument in the District Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals is that it failed to recognize two 
important aspects of the case. 
One, the initial decision concerning the property in 
question in the divorce proceeding was itself being appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court and had not been finalized at the time of 
the hearing. (The fact that it subsequently has been finalized, 
has no bearing on the correctness of the decision at the time.) 
Second, the Judgment divesting the Plaintiff of its 
interest in the property by the Third Party did not divest the 
Plaintiff's interest that it asserted against the Defendant, 
which it would have had if the original Divorce Decree had been 
modified in the appeal. 
Again, the fact that the appeal was decided adversely to 
Richard Burke has no bearing on the correctness of the Summary 
Judgment decision at the time. 
What is interesting, is that the case is now in the 
posture that with the Supreme Court upholding of the Baldwin 
divorce ruling, the subsequent property or the pasture land was 
actually in the name of Richard Burke, who could be substituted 
as a Plaintiff in this action, were it remanded for a new Trial 
and the same allegations could be asserted that he was 
misrepresented by the Defendant and that the misrepresentations 
of the Defendant damaged his interest in the property as it now 
exists. 
There is no question that if Plaintiff's contentions and 
evidentiary assertions are true, that it, through Richard Burke, 
relied upon statements of the Defendant to its detriment and lost 
the ability to maintain an interest in the property, which it 
would have had, had the lis pendens been maintained. That is the 
sole issue to be determined. 
There were conflicting Affidavits presented to Judge 
Billings at the time of the hearing, and there were certainly no 
unrefuted facts that would have allowed for any summary 
disposition. 
The Court's decision in Gadd v. Olsen, 685 P. 2d 1041 
(Utah 1984) concerning a summary proceeding follows a consistent 
line of prior cases indicating that summary disposition should be 
granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the party moved 
against to be true, that the party cannot prevail. 
This case simply should have been allowed to be 
completely litigated in a full evidentiary fashion. Plaintiff 
believes that it is still its right and the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirming the District Court should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon this Court's consistent decisions concerning 
summary proceedings, the District Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals erred in first granting and then affirming a summary 
proceeding in favor of the Defendant without a full evidentiary 
hearing. 
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully request that this case 
be remanded for Trial in the District Court so that the matter 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
srney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Petition For Writ of Certiorari to 
counsel for the Respondent, Mark A. Larsen, Attorney at Law, 310 
South Main Street, #1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage 
prepaid this day of February, 1988. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Advance Business Equipment, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Patricia Wade fka Patrica Burke, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Garff 
JACKSON, Judge: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 860070-CA 
F I L E D 
DEC 1 1 
Timothy W. Snea 
Clerk oi tte Court 
Utah Court ol Appeal 
Advance Business Equipment, Inc. ("ABE") seeks reversal of the 
district cou'rfs dismissal of its fraud complaint with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim. We affirm. 
Before the spring of 1981, ABE was the record owner of 
property in Salt Lake County that was nonetheless split between 
Patricia Burke, now Patricia Wade ("Wade"), and Richard Burke 
("Burke")/ the corporation's president and principal stockholder, in 
a protracted divorce action. She was awarded the portion with a 
home on it; he was awarded the adjacent undeveloped acreage. Both 
parties were unhappy with this division and expressed their intent 
to challenge it on appeal. She claimed she was entitled to an award 
of the entire property; he claimed the entire property was business 
property and not marital property subject to division in the divorce 
action. 
Although the parties* divorce 
decree was not entered until 1984. 
1981, one of ABE's judgment creditors, 
property at a sheriffs sale. Neither 
property during the redemption period. 
trial took place in 1980, the 
In the meantime, on May 12, 
RoyType, purchased the 
Burke nor ABE redeemed the 
RoyType obtained a sheriff's 




on January 27, 1982, which was recorded on 
The following November, RoyType filed a quiet title action 
against ABE, Burke, and Wade. In April, 1983, a partial summary 
judgment was entered in that action against only ABE and Burke, 
declaring that they had no interest in the property and enjoining 
them from asserting any claim in it adverse to RoyType's title. 
Five days after the time for appeal of the partial summary judgment 
ran out, Wade purchased the property from RoyType. 
A year later, ABE filed this action vaguely alleging that Wade 
had defrauded it out of the property. The original complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead fraud with 
particularity, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). The amended 
complaint alleged that Wade told ABE she had placed a lis pendens on 
the property while the divorce decree was pending because she 
intended to appeal the decision to award her less than all of it and 
that she would not "release" the lis pendens. It was further 
alleged that Wade advised ABE, during the redemption period, that 
her lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType 
claim." ABE claimed to have been defrauded in that it relied on 
these representations and "took no action to stop the RoyType 
action." ABE sought an order transferring the property from Wade to 
ABE upon its payment of the amount she had paid to RoyType for the 
property. 
In opposition to Wade's ensuing motion to dismiss, ABE filed 
two affidavits. Richard Burke's merely states that Wade advised him 
during the foreclosure process that she had a lis pendens on the 
property to "in effect, cloud the title" during the appeal of the 
divorce decree. That of Burke's attorney refers to irrelevant 
representations made by the attorney for Roytype (not a party to 
this action), by his own client and by Wade's attorney about her 
placement of a lis pendens on the property and her intent to 
challenge the property division on appeal of the divorce decree. He 
also irrelevantly states his "understanding" that Roytype's partial 
summary judgment against ABE and Burke did not alter any claim Burke 
or ABE might have against Wade concerning the home. There is no 
allegation of any representations by Wade to Burke's counsel. 
The only issue raised by this appeal is whether the facts 
alleged by ABE in its complaint and affidavits, if true, 
sufficiently support a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The 
elements of such a claim are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklesslessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) for the purpose 
of inducing the other party to act upon 
it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; 
860070-CA 2 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to 
his injury and damage. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). SQ& Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Pace v. Parrish, 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). 
We agree with the trial court that appellant's facts, even 
if true, do not state a cause of action for fraud. Indeed, 
several of its alleged facts would, as a matter of law, compel 
the conclusion that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation. 
There were only two representations by Wade which are even 
alleged to have been false. The first is her purported 
statement, "I will not release my lis pendens." It is arguable 
that this was not a false representation since, as appellant's 
counsel admitted at oral argument, Wade never did formally 
release her lis pendens; that release was unnecessary in light 
of her purchase of the subject property from RoyType. In any 
event, even if we assume the statement to be false, it is 
neither a material fact nor the cause of appellant's injury. 
By ABE's own assertion, in its complaint and in its brief 
on appeal, ABE had no defense to the foreclosure action by 
Roytype and "had no way at the time to clear the judgment 
within the normal six month [redemption] period.M Wade did 
maintain her lis pendens at least until late April, 1983, when 
ABE failed to appeal the adverse judgment in Roytype's quiet 
title action. Despite appellant's unsupported insistence 
otherwise, it had no interests in the property after that 
point, regardless of whether Wade's lis pendens was 
maintained. Once ABE's interests in the property were 
extinguished in that action, the corporation had no way of 
reviving its interests in the property, even if it was 
subsequently determined in the divorce appeal to have been 
business property.1 
The second allegedly false representation by Wade is her 
purported advice to ABE, during the redemption period, that her 
lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType 
claim." While it seems that appellant and its counsel believed 
1. The district court's division and award of the property in 
the divorce action was ultimately affirmed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
860070-CA 3 
throughout this litigation that Wade's lis pendens would 
somehow prevent RoyType from taking marketable title through 
the foreclosure proceeding and quiet title action, her lis 
pendens merely provided notice to RoyType (and other ABE 
creditors) that she was claiming it all as marital property 
that was or should have been awarded to her in the divorce 
action. Roytype's title, acquired after purchase at the 
sheriffs sale, was subject only to her rights in the property 
as eventually adjudicated in the divorce appeal. 
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves 
the status quo by keeping the subject of 
the lawsuit within the power and control 
of the court until judgment or decree 
shall be entered. The recording of a lis 
pendens serves as a warning to all persons 
that any rights or interests they may 
acquire in the interim are subject to the 
judgment or decree. 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978). 
See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Utah 
1979) . 
Even assuming that Wade gave ABE erroneous legal advice 
about the effect of her lis pendens on his interests, it is the 
general rule that "misrepresentations of law or of the legal 
effect of contracts and writings does [sic] not constitute 
remedial fraud." Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 
264, 276 (1947) (quoting Ackerman v. Bramwell Inv. Co., 80 Utah 
52, 12 P.2d 623, 626 (1932)). Appellant has not alleged any 
special circumstances that might make this rule inapplicable. 
See Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 1984). 
Furthermore, ABE was represented by the same counsel throughout 
this case and the quiet title action, the same counsel who 
represented Burke in the divorce. Neither ABE nor its attorney 
could have reasonably relied on legal advice from Wade. 
Because it appears to a certainty that ABE would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of its claim, dismissal of the amended 
complaint was appropriate. Freegard v. First Western Nat'l 
860070-CA 4 
Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). The order and judgment 
below is affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
860070-CA 5 




Advance Business Equipment, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Patricia Wade fka Patricia Burke, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson and Garff. 
Clert cf the Court 
Utah CoJft ot Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 860070-CA 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Advance Business Equipment, Inc. ("ABE") seeks reversal of the 
district court's dismissal of its fraud complaint with prejudice for 
failure to state a claim. We affirm. 
Before the spring of 1981, ABE was the record owner of 
property in Salt Lake County that was nonetheless split between 
Patricia Burke, now Patricia Wade ("Wade"), and Richard Burke 
("Burke"), the corporation's president and principal stockholder, in 
a protracted divorce action. She was awarded the portion with a 
home on it; he was awarded the adjacent undeveloped acreage. Both 
parties were unhappy with this division and expressed their intent 
to challenge it on appeal. She claimed she was entitled to an award 
of the entire property; he claimed the entire property was business 
property and not marital property subject to division in the divorce 
action. 
Although the parties' divorce trial took place in 1980, the 
decree was not entered until 1984. In the meantime, on May 12, 
1981, one of ABE's judgment creditors, RoyType, purchased the 
property at a sheriff's sale. Neither Burke nor ABE redeemed the 
property during the redemption period. RoyType obtained a sheriff's 
deed to the property on January 27, 1982, which was recorded on 
February 4, 1982. 
The following November, RoyType filed a quiet title action 
against ABE, Burke, and Wade. In April, 1983, a partial summary 
judgment was entered in that action against only ABE and Burke, 
declaring that they had no interest in the property and enjoining 
them from asserting any claim in it adverse to RoyType's title. 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to 
his injury and damage. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980)- See Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Pace v. Parrish, 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). 
We agree with the trial court that appellant's facts, even 
if true, do not state a cause of action for fraud. Indeed, 
several of its alleged facts would, as a matter of law, compel 
the conclusion that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation. 
There were only two representations by Wade which are even 
alleged to have been false. The first is her purported 
statement, "I will not release my lis pendens.M It is arguable 
that this was not a false representation since, as appellant's 
counsel admitted at oral argument, Wade never did formally 
release her lis pendens; that release was unnecessary in light 
of her purchase of the subject property from RoyType. In any 
event, even if we assume the statement to be false, it is 
neither a material fact nor the cause of appellant's injury. 
By ABE's own assertion, in its complaint and in its brief 
on appeal, ABE had no defense to the foreclosure action by 
Roytype and "had no way at the time to clear the judgment 
within the normal six month [redemption] period." Wade did 
maintain her lis pendens at least until late April, 1983, when 
ABE failed to appeal the adverse judgment in Roytype's quiet 
title action. Despite appellant's unsupported insistence 
otherwise, it had no interests in the property after that 
point, regardless of whether Wade's lis pendens was 
maintained. Once ABE's interests in the property were 
extinguished in that action, the corporation had no way of 
reviving its interests in the property, even if it was 
subsequently determined in the divorce appeal to have been 
business property.1 
The second allegedly false representation by Wade is her 
purported advice to ABE, during the redemption period, that her 
lis pendens would "protect the property from the RoyType 
claim." While it seems that appellant and its counsel believed 
1. The district court's division and award of the property in 
the divorce action was ultimately affirmed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
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Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). The order and judgment 
below is affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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